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THE CULTURE AND CONFLICT REVIEW 
WMD Intelligence Analysis of Lessons from Iraq to Iran: Only dot the I’s – don’t
cross the T’s
Glen Segell, 4/1/2010 
On January 29, 2010, former British Prime Minister Tony Blair gave evidence to the Iraq Enquiry in
London, which was broadcast worldwide on satellite TV by the BBC. He emphasized the need to learn
the lessons of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) from the case of Iraq for the case of Iran. In his
words “propping up one dictator to handle another dictator is not the way, we must get rid of the
dictator.” More interesting is how many intelligence analysts are being instructed to dot the I’s but in the
case of Iraq the analysis went to far and also crossed the T’s. Here is the previously untold story of
what really happened.
Blair’s evidence shows that there will be many evaluations on how and why politicians made a decision
to go to war in Iraq over weapons of mass destruction (WMD). This article will do so by piecing together
Blair’s evidence to show how defense and security decision makers erroneously relied too heavily on an
open source narrative. The problem of this narrative arose because over a period of 12 years from
Operation Desert Storm (1991) the press quoted politicians, generals, scientists and experts who then
quoted the press who then quoted politicians, generals, scientists and experts. In doing so a narrative
was constructed about Iraqi WMD that bore little resemblance to reality in 2003 on the eve of war. This
was despite each fact of the narrative being accurate in its own right at the time it was first reported. The
problem as will be shown in this article is that this new and exaggerated narrative emerged from the sum
of many narratives creating the false impression that Iraq had WMD in 2003. This false narrative lacked
a coherent or accurate time-scale. This false narrative was time-compressed giving the impression that
the contents referred to a period of weeks when in fact they referred to a period of many years.
Inherently any security analysis of the false narrative was doomed to be inaccurate.
Essential to evaluating this episode is separating the original narratives, the subsequent narrative that
was created from these narratives and the security analysis. Essential is to understand that the open
source narrative was a journalistic account of events. Any journalistic narrative may or may not contain
100 percent accurate facts given that journalism abides by a combination of sensationalism, innuendo
and facts. Hence partly to blame in the creation of the false narrative was the lack of understanding or
the indifference by security analysis and politicians about the process by which the press publishes
stories. Journalistic accounts are often re-written by editorial teams emerging in press as combinations
on a sliding scale of ensuring 100 percent accuracy or a sensational story that might contain rumors or
innuendos when pandering to the demand of populace and indeed editors-in-chief. This is not unusual
in journalism – it is often acceptable to do this. It is assumed that the public demand a good story to
remain tuned a specific TV channel or read a specific newspaper. It is also assumed that the public
accept that press reports contain rumours, innuendos and suppositions. Clichés often voiced about this
are “the reconstruction of news as a story, of information in narrative style abides in the conventional
wisdom of journalism” and “the global culture of 24 hours news channel with a craving populace and
intense competition for advertising revenue provokes press to provide a sensational story in
newsworthiness”.
It is accepted that frequently the press is not able to sustain 100 percent certainty of evidence and the
story may change from day-to-day as new evidence emerges. Newspaper cannot be held responsible
for publishing and inaccurate story on Monday if by Tuesday they publish another story that has
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different evidence that has just come to light. Frequently the press also have a problem of holding
audience attention and indeed sales over repetitive information which is not sensational. This was the
case during the time-line of the story of many decades of innuendo about Iraqi WMD. During this period
it is doubtful if any journalist and maybe not many of their sources actually saw any WMD themselves.
Too be sure this was also a problem for the intelligence services – WMD was hearsay where there was
a claim of 100 percent certainty that it existed but 0 percent certainty of where it was. Throughout this
saga numerous and different journalists in unconnected newspapers, and TV and radio stations were
compelled by editors, based on assumed public demand, to report the overwhelming political intent
voiced as rhetoric to wage war. In part, this pressure and subsequent confusion led the daily press
narrative of events to become a false narrative of government reports covering the 12 year period – no
WMD was discovered in Iraq. Hence part and parcel of how the situation arose was the hazy distinction
in newsworthiness between fictional and journalistic narrative on specific events.
From this unintended or indifferent confusion there are two important lessons. The first lesson is for
journalists to check their sources and to be wary of the specific and accurate facts in a narrative and to
be careful that a narrative doesn’t develop into a new and misleading narrative. The second lesson is for
security analysts to seek multiple sources of information and not to rely too heavily on open sources.
Journalistic practises should not be acceptable to security analysts that should demand 100
percent precise information especially in the case of justification for war.
Henceforth this article will continue by reconstructing how this situation arose under the headings: press
reporting; the error in analysis, the false narrative; and the journalists and the spies.
Press Reporting
The back round of the narrative on WMD and Iraq stretches back to the Iran-Iraq War (1981-1989) when
chemical weapon agents were used. During this period Israel also destroyed the Osirak nuclear reactor
in 1981 fearing that Iraq was about to attain nuclear weapon capability through its uranium enrichment
process. In the aftermath of the first Gulf War (1990-1). UNSCOM uncovered and dismantled a
research, development and production infrastructure for biological, toxin and chemical weapons as well
as destroying stockpiles of the same in Iraq. An innuendo arose when UNSCOM inspectors informed
that much of its work was left unfinished when they were forced to terminate their operations in 1997.[1]
A security analyst could well assume that Iraq at this stage could resume a WMD program given that it
had the same regime with the same leader, faced a similar threat environment and might have similar
aspirations. Such an assumption could be strengthened with the exposition of a policy against Iraq in the
form of President Bush's ‘Axis of Evil' speech[2] and the subsequent release of Security Strategy (NSS)
in 2002. These dictated preemptive war against rogue states that inter-alia flouted United Nations
resolutions pertaining to non-proliferation and WMD – Iraq being a prime perpetrator.[3]
Hence the count-down towards war commenced based upon assumed Iraqi WMD. An insight to how a
false narrative had been constructed leading to inaccurate security analysis is possible from the Hutton
Report (2003) into the suicide of a weapons expert, Dr Kelly. This report highlighted the role of press
(BBC), specific reporters (Mr. Gilligan) and certain policymakers (Prime Minister Blair and Secretary of
Defense Hoon). The later Lord Butler report (2004) that in part contradicted the Hutton report showed
that the intelligence information relied upon by both the press and government was inaccurate.[4]
To be sure Lord Butler indicated that both government and the press used the same sources of
information and even had similar methods of analysis. Politicians receiving information from the
intelligence agencies and watching the press were convinced that they were receiving information from
two different sources. They therefore informed the public and sought to proceed with coercive diplomacy
and armed conflict under the assumption that the overall information was accurate that Iraq had WMD.
However it appeared that government was quoting the press who in turn were quoting government. In
reality there was therefore only one source of information and not two.
How this transpired can be reconstructed by taking the reporting of Iraqi WMD by an established
reputable newspaper such as the London based newspaper – The Telegraph.[5] Based upon analysis of
commercially available American satellite photographs in September 2002, the newspaper disclosed that
Saddam had possibly reconstructed three plants that had been used to manufacture biological and
chemical weapons that UNSCOM had previously destroyed. The article also reported that satellite
photos disclosed secret activities at a uranium production facility at Al-Qaim, 160 miles west of
Baghdad. The same story appeared in other morning broadsheets such as The Times, The Independent
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and the Guardian as well as the tabloids such as The Sun and The Star. That evening, relying upon the
same satellite information, the world-respected BBC informed the public that Prime Minister Tony Blair
intended to present a dossier on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction to the public and to Parliament the
following week. It also reported that Members of Parliament would be recalled from holiday recess to
discuss security plans against states rogue to arms control norms. In essence this was not a sensational
story nor was it of particular newsworthiness – the story of Iraq WMD had been ongoing for over 20
years.
By the next morning competing 24-hour television news channels had made the sensational claim that
inside information, reputably Downing Street, had stated that the Prime Minister would release a dossier
to provide crucial evidence about the need for military action against Iraq. Newspapers, radio and TV
were offering analysis and interviews with experts that the dossier would also be a catalyst to force a
showdown with ministers who expressed disquiet about the prospect of military intervention; to quell
resistance in the Labour Party in particular Robin Cook, the Leader of the House, Clare Short, the
International Development Secretary, and Margaret Beckett, the Environment Secretary; to demand that
each minister spells out his or her position on Iraq, so that the prime minister could isolate the “doves”;
and to provide information about two al-Qa'eda operatives trained in Iraq to assassinate leading Kurds
and to build chemical warfare facilities during the 1990s. The public became more intrigued as the press
filed story after story quoting Western intelligence estimates that “Saddam Hussein could be months
away from developing a nuclear bomb if he could find a source of weapons-grade material”[6] and that
“Saddam had resumed work on trying to enrich uranium”[7]. Adding to the intrigue the press quoted
American intelligence agencies informing they stopped an attempt by Iraq to buy thousands of aluminum
tubes for use in centrifuges to enrich uranium which seemed a resurrection of the 1980s political scandal
of “Iraqi Super-Gun Affair.”[8]
All of such reporting was sensational journalism but lacked the essential ingredient for security analysis
– tangible evidence. To make the narrative more realistic government thus gave the abstract notion of
Iraqi WMD a face when Condoleezza Rice, the American security adviser appeared on television to
inform about Iraq: “We do know that he is actively pursuing a nuclear weapon .... We don't want the
smoking gun to be a mushroom cloud.”[9] Despite the newsworthiness of the narrative it is not clear
what Rice's sources of information were, so the press sought Iraqi defectors to inform of eye-witness
here-say about Saddam's chemical weapons. To further sustain the story security officials were
interviewed in programs such as BBC documentary Panorama about such allegations. Indeed, a senior
security official told The New York Times about Iraq and its leader: “The jewel in the crown is nuclear ....
The closer he gets to a nuclear capability, the more credible is his threat to use chemical or biological
weapons .... This made an invasion of Iraq imperative .... The closer Saddam Hussein gets to a nuclear
weapon, the harder he will be to deal with.”[10]
Henceforth the public was bombarded with news quoting multiple sources making it sufficient for any
person in the street to be aware albeit not convinced that Iraq was well on the path to be a threat to
local, regional and maybe even global security. There was also substantial media coverage of those
opposed to any form of war, those specifically opposed to war against rogue states such as Iraq and
those skeptical of actual Iraqi WMD capability including the International Atomic Energy Agency.
The Error in Analysis
A hindsight reading of the narrative on Iraqi WMD shows that each part of the narrative provided little if
any evidence to justify war. It is only the sum of the parts that offers the potential danger of WMD. A
starting point to consider the error in the security analysis is the publication of two dossiers detailing
evidence of Iraq's plans to acquire and deploy chemical, biological and nuclear weapons. The first was
in September 2002 and the second in February 2003 – the Iraq war being authorized by Parliament and
commencing in March 2003. The press coverage tantalizing the public about “evidence on Iraqi WMD”
commenced a few weeks before the first dossier.
To give credibility when presenting the first dossier to the House of Commons the Prime Minister stated
on 24 September 2002 “It [the intelligence service] concludes that Iraq has chemical and biological
weapons, that Saddam has continued to produce them, that he has existing and active military plans for
the use of chemical and biological weapons, which could be activated within 45 minutes, including
against his own Shia population; and that he is actively trying to acquire nuclear weapons
capability.”[11]
To demonstrate the errors in security analysis would be to break down such a statement into segments
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of intent, capability and assumption. Namely: 1) Intent: “he has existing and active military plans for the
use of chemical and biological weapons against his own Shia population, he is actively trying to acquire
nuclear weapons capability”, 2) Capability: “Iraq has chemical and biological weapons” 3) Assumption:
“could be activated within 45 minutes”. In part none of the information provided would be of value to
justify a war. When each part between comas is combined into a single sentence then a serious security
threat is portrayed. Comprehending the error in analysis is highlight that each part of the Prime Ministers
statement refers to a different event that arose between 1981-2002. As they were presented in a single
sentence in 2002 gave a false impression. Unwittingly the Prime Minister also stated “once the public
has seen the evidence people will see this is not something that has been invented or dreamed up in the
last few weeks. This is a real and serious issue”.[12] In doing so the scene was set for war to disarm
Iraq of WMD but as yet no-one had actually seen the evidence.
On 8 November 2002 a debate took place in the UN Security Council regarding the deteriorating Iraqi
situation. This was despite no update of specific information from 1998 to 2002. Namely the sum of the
facts presented in the UN debate were of more significance than any of the individual facts.
Subsequently UN Security Council Resolution 1441 was approved as a process of deadlines to disarm
Saddam Hussein of WMD by armed force. On 18 November 2002 UN weapon inspectors returned to
Iraq and on 9 January 2003 Hans Blix the UN chief weapons inspector told the UN Security Council that
no smoking gun had been found in Iraq.
The second dossier was presented to the British public in February 2003. When released to the public
the impression was given that the dossier was an up-to-date assessment from the Secret Intelligence
Services (SIS/MI6). In a foreword to the second dossier, the Prime Minister said that the publication of
such secret information was unprecedented. This second dossier claiming to draw on previously secret
intelligence material claimed Iraq's attempts to acquire nuclear weapons and to develop long-range
missiles capable of hitting Israel or British bases in Cyprus. The dossier detailed how Iraq continued to
produce chemical and biological agents and had drawn up plans for their use. It stated that Iraq could
have a nuclear weapon one to two years after obtaining the necessary fissile material. The Prime
Minister quoted from the dossier when presenting it to the House of Commons “The intelligence is clear:
(Saddam) continues to believe his WMD programme is essential both for internal repression and for
external aggression. The biological agents we believe Iraq can produce include anthrax, botulinum,
toxin, aflatoxin and ricin. All eventually result in excruciatingly painful death.”[13] President Bush
welcomed the second dossier stating “I again call for the UN to pass a strong resolution holding this
man to account. And if they're unable to do so, the United States and our friends will act.”[14] During the
subsequent parliamentary vote it was clear that the narrative and the manner of presentation of both the
dossiers with emphasis on certain points was the securing nadir for the cautious backing of MPs for
military action to force Saddam Hussein to disarm.
If such statements were to be broken down into segments of intent, capability and assumption then
once again none of the information in part would be of value to justify a war. When the parts, or each
part between comas are combined into a single sentence then a picture is contrived to provide a
portrayal of serious security threat. However, each part between the comas is in reality an event that
took place at a different time in a period spanning decades. An explanation of such an error in security
analysis could not be made more succinctly than by Boris Johnson, then Conservative MP for Henley,
“[Mr Scarlett] was in the position of a foreign editor who has before him a campaigning editor [Mr
Campbell]. He's got a story that's not quite hot or strong enough and he agrees to hype it up because he
thinks he can get away with it, because he thinks the facts may well turn out to support his editor's
desire and because he wants to be obliging”[15]
The public was skeptical leading to mass rallies. Independent security analysts said both British dossiers
lacked a “killer fact” and contained no big surprises. The Iraqi government dismissed the document as
“totally baseless”, repeating its claim that it no longer had any weapons of mass destruction. Labour
Party rebels said it was a “damp squib” and a “PR stunt” and did not provide the justification for all-out
war. The press reported all of this as well as the skepticism by MPs from all parties noting that many
would back action only if it was sanctioned by a second United Nations Security Council Resolution.[16]
By this stage, however, press no longer had a role to play in conveying the narrative of whether or not
Iraq had WMD.[17] The newsworthy story migrated towards the parliamentary debate on war, during
March 2003, and subsequently the war itself. On 20 March 2003, after the UN failed to agree a second
resolution, war on Iraq began with American missile strikes and on 2 May 2003 George Bush declared
victory. This would have been the end of the story had WMD been discovered in Iraq – but this would
not be the case.
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The False Narrative
The crises of determining how the error had been made in the security analysis started on 29 May 2003
when the war was all but over – but WMD had not yet been found in Iraq. BBC broadcast journalist
Andrew Gilligan reported on the governments September 2002 dossier quoting a senior government
source that the dossier had been transformed by No.10 Downing Street against the wishes of the
intelligence community. He claimed that caveats had been removed and that information such as the
45-minute activation claim had been “sexed-up”. In other words that the narrative of Iraq WMD had
been intentionally created from the sum of its parts. In brief that government had been presenting old,
redundant and superfluous information and assumptions on Iraqi WMD capability and intent.
On 10 July 2003 Dr David Kelly was named as the suspected source while government continued to
deny the story. On 17 July 2003 Dr Kelly was found dead, apparently a suicide. This forced a focus on
the content of Gilligan's story. Downing Street admitted making a serious error in the content of the
relevant dossier on Iraq and WMD as it emerged that 10 of the 19 pages of the dossier were copied from
a student's PhD thesis (Ibrahim al-Marashi) that related to events around the time of the Gulf War in
1991. This had been published on the Internet in the Israel-based Middle East Review of International
Affairs (MERIA). Clearly it could not be considered as an authoritative source for current considerations
on actual Iraq capability. The other main sources in the dossier were articles written in Jane's
Intelligence Review by Ken Gause, an intersecurity analyst, and Sean Boyne.[18] In other words it was
true that government had been presenting old, redundant and superfluous information and assumptions
on Iraqi WMD capability. However there was no indication of who was to blame for doing so.
The revelations were all the more embarrassing for Downing Street because the dossier had been
praised by Colin Powell, the US Secretary of State, in his presentation to the United Nations Security
Council in justification of war.[19] It further emerged that two compilers of the second dossier on Iraq's
alleged weapons of mass destruction were posted to Baghdad from Downing Street only days before
Prime Minister Blair announced two parliamentary inquiries into the alleged misuse of intelligence
information by the government. Paul Hamill and Naheed Mehta, who could have shed light on the
dossier's preparation, were moved from the Communication and Information Centre, a No 10
department located within the Foreign Office, to work as press officers for the Office of Reconstruction
and Humanitarian Assistance and the Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad.[20]
Following this were allegations and counter-allegations regarding: 1) the falseness of specific facts in
the dossier's content and 2) the falseness of the BBC's source about the falseness of the dossier. The
sensationalism came from denials from all sides. Security analysts contested the BBC’s stories while the
Prime Minister continued to insist, even as late as 4 June 2003 after the end of hostilities and after no
WMD had been uncovered, that “There are literally thousands of [WMD] sites.”[21] Even when
presenting evidence on 8 July 2003 to the Commons liaison committee the Prime Minister was adamant
that “I don't concede it at all  that the intelligence at the time was wrong. I have absolutely no doubt at all
that we will find evidence of weapons of mass destruction programs.”[22]
Controversy raged when former Cabinet Ministers Robin Cook and Clare Short informed a Parliamentary
investigating Committee that they were told by the Secret Intelligence Services (SIS/ MI6) in the run-up
to the invasion of Iraq that Saddam Hussein did not have any weapons of mass destruction capable of
posing a threat to British security. In separate appearances before MPs, the two former Cabinet
ministers confirmed that they had each received regular personal briefings from officers of the SIS, who
had persuaded them that Saddam Hussein was not a “current and serious” threat. Mr. Cook, who
resigned days before war broke out, said his claim that Iraq did not possess “a credible device capable
of being delivered against a strategic target had reflected almost word for word a briefing he received
from the SIS”.[23]
Ms. Short also gave MPs a graphic account of the way Mr Blair bypassed the Cabinet, tried to prevent
his ministers from receiving SIS briefings and left the decisions on the invasion of Iraq to a small,
unelected entourage in his private office. Ms. Short, who walked out of the Cabinet after the war,
claiming Mr. Blair had deceived her, said her regular SIS personal briefings had convinced her that
Saddam Hussein was dangerous but did not have the capacity to carry out his threat. She said “It’s this
phrase weapons of mass destruction. When it's used, people think of bombs full of chemical and
biological material raining out of the sky. They don't think of scientists and laboratories and experiments.
That's where the falsity lies”.[24]
The Journalists and the Spies
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Blame can not be placed solely at the door of the politicians. In a separate investigation in August 2003
Lord Hutton, a retired judge, began six weeks of hearings about the circumstances around Dr Kelly's
death. His remit was to focus on the events that may have led to Dr Kelly's death, rather than the wider
issue of Iraq's alleged weapons of mass destruction. Former SIS employee and former chairman of the
Joint Intelligence Committee, John Scarlett, gave evidence. Private e-mails and memos, minutes of
private meetings, even extracts from Alastair Campbell's private journals (then director of
communications at Downing Street and a former journalist) were all made available to Hutton. In
January 2004, the Hutton report ruled that Dr Kelly committed suicide and cleared the government over
the 45 minutes claim. Mr. Gilligan's (The BBC journalist) claim Downing Street had “sexed-up” the case
against Saddam Hussein in its September 2002 dossier – inserting information it “probably knew” to be
wrong - was dismissed out of hand. The government – and the Prime Minister – were cleared of any
wrong doing.
However it later emerged that a month prior to the Hutton enquiry, in July 2003, that the SIS had
withdrawn intelligence that helped support the September 2002 dossier allegedly without the knowledge
of senior security formulators including the Prime Minister. Hence the Prime Minister's evidence to the
Hutton Inquiry was technically inaccurate.[25]
This was not the end of the story. American President George W Bush ordered an inquiry into alleged
intelligence failings in the run-up to the Iraq war (2003) – given that no WMD had been found. Prime
Minister Tony Blair followed suit. On 3 February 2004 ex-civil service head Lord Butler was given the
remit to lead inquiry where his report, published on Wednesday 14 July 2004, highlighted failings in
British intelligence and governmental procedures.[26] The core of the report was its painstaking
investigation why so many experienced people misjudged the quality of, and drew erroneous
conclusions from, a limited number of sources; and failed in early 2003, in the light of the already
apparent inconsistency between these conclusions and the findings, or non-findings, of the weapon
inspectors, to look again at the intelligence material and subject it to re-validation. Butler found that it
was the failure of intelligence which was the reason for the failure of the policy and which left the British
Government in a situation it had almost certainly hoped to avoid, namely having to decide whether to
support the Americans militarily without wider international backing, or whether to stand aside at the last
minute and let them take action on their own.[27]
Lord Butlers report sent journalists and politicians scurrying back to Lord Hutton's report into Dr Kelly's
death. The BBC director general confirmed that Andrew Gilligan the BBC reporter, had claimed based
upon his interviews with Dr Kelly that there was “ample evidence” the government had “sexed up” the
Iraq dossier and that caveats were removed and certain things were given more weight than they could
bear. Lord Hutton had said that the key claims in Mr Gilligan's story were “unfounded” and cleared the
government of “sexing up” the dossier. However, Lord Butler's report essentially found both Dr Kelley
and the BBC to be accurate in that caveats had been removed from the dossier and that the claims Iraq
could activate WMD in 45 minutes were not substantiated. So Lord Hutton found the BBC to be incorrect
about its allegations that the information was incorrect and incorrect on who had 'sexed-up the dossier
while Lord Butler found the BBC to be correct about its allegations that the information was incorrect but
incorrect that the blame lay at Downing Street. The ensuing question was – Had anyone intentionally
created a false narrative out of the sum of its parts? Lord Butler pointed a finger at the intelligence
agencies but did not state whether this was at the best of anyone or by their own initiative[28] Skeptic’s
to both the Hutton and the Butler reports tend to quote Foreign Secretar.y Jack Straw who gave
evidence to a Parliamentary inquiry six months before the Butler report and which tend to contradict
some of the Butler findings placing blame on Alistair Campbell. Jack Straw singled him out as the driving
force behind the dossier on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction.[29] Both Hutton and Butler chose not to
include this evidence in their reports!
The truth might never be known since the Butler report revealed that minutes were not taken of the
many government meetings. In hindsight maybe the journalist accounts have become the crucial
recorder of history – whether accurately or not may never be known. The end of the episode when came
the Prime Minister, on 6 July 2004, in giving evidence to the Commons Liaison Committee stated “I
have to accept we haven't found them (WMD) and we may never find them. We don't know what has
happened to them. They could have been removed. They could have been hidden. They could have
been destroyed.”[30] In response to the Butler Report the Prime Minister, in a statement on 14 July
2004 admitted, “We expected, I expected to find actual usable, chemical or biological weapons after we
entered Iraq. But I have to accept, as the months have passed, it seems increasingly clear that at the
time of invasion, Saddam did not have stockpiles of chemical or biological weapons ready to
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deploy.”[31] The final word must rest with Peter Mandelson the former Cabinet minister who stated
“Thank goodness we live in a country where these matters are determined on the basis of fact, on the
basis of judgments rather than on the basis of media show trials and kangaroo courts which, if it were
otherwise, would be like living in a reverse police state.”[32]
Conclusion
Notwithstanding the end of the narrative given that Blair admitted that no WMD was found in Iraq there
remains relevance in contemplating the role of specific individuals in the security analysis. These
individuals have been revealed as the journalist (Andrew Gilligan), the former journalist cum adviser to
the Prime Minister (Alistair Campbell), the scientist (Dr Kelly) and the spy (John Scarlett). Indeed, the
various inquiries show that these individuals were responsible for having compiled, provided, presented
and/or critiqued the evidence or lack thereof of Iraqi WMD. There is no evidence to suggest that these
individuals were implicated in creating or fabricating facts. However and essential in security matters it is
not always the narrative but always the analysis that is crucial especially for public opinion, for
parliamentary debate, for United Nations Security Council Resolutions and indeed the decision to wage
war. There was clearly a failure of analysts and of the political elite to differentiate between each fact in
the narrative of Iraq WMD over a period of decades and a new narrative constructed out of the sum of
its parts. This is truly applicable as the world faces a decision on what to do with WMD in Iran.
Clearly decades of innuendo of Iraqi WMD and a political rhetoric for war construed a new misleading
time-compressed narrative comprising many small narratives each accurate in its own right but not
accurate for security decision making purposes. The press was a conduit of information but this proved
to be fatal – the press quoted politicians who quoted the press leading to the construction of the
misleading narrative. There was a failure by journalists to read their own previous stories, seek new
evidence and to refrain from quoting those who had quoted news stories. This constitutes the first
lesson – the lesson for journalists to be wary of the specific and accurate facts in a narrative and to be
cautious that a new and misleading narrative does not develop especially when a story unfolds over a
period of decades. Even though the press was a conduit of information there is no evidence to suggest
that government controlled the media or that the media swayed government. Throughout the entire
process the most skeptical entity was the public. To be sure there would seem to be substantial
evidence of the press as an arbiter of security – as an agent of power rather than a wielder of power.
Herein lies the second lesson – the lesson for security analysts and decision-makers to seek multiple
sources of intelligence not relying too much on open sources. Such a lesson is evident from this article
that has shown how problematic it is for journalists, pressured by their editors and assumed public
demand, to distinguish the hazy distinction in newsworthiness between fictional and journalistic
narrative. The journalist needs to consider a range of combinations on a sliding scale of ensuring 100%
accuracy or a sensational story that might contain rumours when pandering to the demand of populace.
Such haziness is acceptable to journalism and to the public. However such haziness should not
permeate into the compilation and presentation of intelligence dossiers to security decision makers.
When it does as in the case of Iraq and WMD then it is of no surprise both the press and security
decision makers have lost considerable credibility.
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